Nov. 6 (Bloomberg) -- For three years, Aviel Rubin and his team of computer-security specialists at Johns Hopkins studied the software for the controversial paper-free voting system that will be widely used Tuesday.
In his new book, ``Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting,'' Rubin argues that not only can the system be manipulated, but worse, we would never know. We spoke on the telephone last week about his problems with these machines, which are mostly supplied by Diebold Inc.Campion: ATMs have a pretty good track record for accuracy and accountability: the paper trail. Is it so difficult to build that same kind of accountability into an electronic voting machine?
Rubin: We have to look at the differences between a voting system and an ATM. I wonder how many people would be willing to use an ATM if the ATM was not allowed to keep track of which customer took out money and if you didn't get a monthly statement at the end of the month that said how much money you took out.
We have a private vote, so the voting system is not allowed to keep track of who voted for whom. You don't get a statement that says how you voted after the election, so I think the problem in voting -- because of the privacy of the vote -- is much, much harder.
Campion: At one point you said that the codes were so exposed it was like every door in America had the same lock and the key was nailed up beside the door.
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